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ABSTRACT
Thepurpose of this paper is to provide a typology of different
labor market configurations and investigate how two major
structural adjustment policies, namely a trade liberalization
reform and the relaxation of capital controls, affect the level of
aggregate employment and the rate of unemployment. We consider a
number of models starting from the traditional Australian approach.
We then analyze a multiple sectors intertemporal setting and a
model with uncertainty and search. We identify situations under
which structural adjustment results in unemployment.
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I. Introduction
Most "official" plans to deal with the debt crisis contemplate
significant economic reforms in the developing countries. In particular, the
Baker plan, the Brady plan, and the programs sponsored by the International
Monetary Fund and the World Bank include as one of their key components
significant reforms aimed at opening up these economies to the rest of the
world. In fact, it is not an exaggeration to say that at this time a reform
of their trade regime is one of the most important policy prescriptions being
considered by the authorities of the developing nations.1
A number of observers have noted that in spite of clear theoretical
arguments and of the insistence with which trade liberalization is pushed by
the multilateral agencies, many countries vehemently resist it. How can we
explain this? If trade reform is as desirable as economists have argued, why
do we see so few sustained efforts at opening up the developing countries?
There is no doubt that trade liberalization entails adjustment costs, which
often take the form of increased aggregate unemployment. The question though
is: Why do these costs induce so much resistence? particularly in light of
the expectation of future social benefits. Why does the road to protection-
ism, which also entails an adjustment process, appear so much smoother?
Surprisingly, most of the policy literature on structural reform and
liberalization of the external sector has tended to sidestep the question of
unemployment.2 Moreover, in those studies that take the simple Heckscher-
recent study by Thomas (1989) shows that the great majority of World
Bank Structural Adjustment Loans (SALs) have had a trade liberalization
component as a condition for releasing funds.
2There are, however, a few exceptions. Krueger (1983), for instance,
discusses the empirical relation between trade orientation and employment in
the long run. The World Bank study directed by Michaely, Choksi and
Papageorgiou (1986) deals with the employment effects of trade reforms,2
Ohlin model as a benchmark the issue is completely nonexisting. In fact,
according to the simplest textbook approach, in a small developing economy
with capital intensive imports, fully mobile factors of production and
flexible prices, the reduction of import tariffs will have no effect on
total employment even in the short run. In this setup the only labor market
effects of trade liberalization will be a reallocation of labor out of the
importables sector and an increase in the real wage rate.3 In reality,
however, there exist a number of reasons why these textbook condition will
not hold, and why tariff reforms can result in a decline of employment in
the short run. In fact, existing historical evidence suggests that in many
cases trade liberalization reforms have been associated with short-run
increases in unemployment (Edwards 1990).
The Ricardo-Viner model with real wage rigidity provides the simplest
framework for illustrating the possible short run employment consequences of
a tariff reform. In this model capital is, in the short-run, fixed to its
sector of origin; only slowly through time (and possibly via investment) can
capital be reallocated. Contrary to the more traditional textbook case with
full flexibility of prices and resource movements, in this more realistic
setting a tariff reduction can result in a decrease of the eauilibrium real
wsge rate required to maintain full employment. However, if for some reason
the economy's labor market is distorted --dueto a government imposed
minimum wage, or to the existence of indexation clauses -- therewill be
downward inflexibility of real wages, and the required reduction in the wage
while Edwards (1990) discusses the unemployment ramifications of a cross
section of liberalization attempts.
3This result, of course, is what is predicted by the Stolper-Samuelson
theorem under the (plsusible) assumption that imports are relatively capital
intensive.rate will not take place. As a result of this rigidity, some fraction of
the labor force will become unemployed.
This paper is motivated by the crucial role that labor markets behavior
may play in determining the success of liberalization policies and provides
a theoretical survey on the ways labor markets can react to structural
adjustment reforms. More specifically, we provide a typology of different
labor market configurations and investigate how two main liberalization
policies -- areduction of import tariffs and the relaxation of capital
controls -- willaffect the level of aggregate employment and the rate of
unemployment. Our analysis is based on the exploration of the employment
implications of several models proposed in the literature.4 We start with a
brief discussion of the standard Australian or dependent economy model with
flexible wages and prices, pointing out its deficiencies (Section II). -This
model provides a benchmark case that is then used to discuss different
extensions. In Section III we incorporate labor market distortions in the
form of wage rigidities to the discussion. Here we make a distinction
between economy-wide and sector-specific wage rigidity. The analysis in
this section assumes that capital is sector-specific. In that regard, this
discussion should be interpreted as referring to short-run situations.
Section IV incorporates en intertemporal dimension and deals with both the
employment effects of relaxing capital controls and the employment implica-
tions of anticipated trade liberalization reforms. In Section V we relax
the standard trade theory assumption of a fixed labor supply, and consider a
model with upward-sloping labor supply and queuing. In this section we pay
4We survey and summarize a number of existing models including some we
have used in our previous work such as Edwards (1988, 1990) and Cox-Edwards
(1986).4
closer attention to the initial labor market conditions of a typical
protected economy. We assume that along with trade protection the economy
is characterized by labor unions or some other institutionalized form of
labor protection.5 Thus, ironically, the factor of production that is sup-
posed to gain from freer trade is actually gaining from trade restrictions.
Needless to say, it is not the entire labor force that benefits from
protectionism but only the more organized sectors. It is perhaps within
this setting that the resistance to trade liberalization can be better
understood. Finally, Section VI contains the concluding remarks.
XI. Tariff Liberalization andLaborMarket Adlustiient in the Standard
Australian Model
In this section we discuss the way in which a tariff liberalization
reform affects the labor market in the standard Australian model with
flexible prices and no market distortions.6 In the following sections we
will use these results as a benchmark to be compared with those obtained
from alternative specifications of the labor market.
Consider the case of a small country that produces and consumes three
goods --importables(M), exportables (X), and nontradables (N).7
5Labor unions have a stronger negotiatingpower and sometimes even
monopsony power in a closed economy.
6This model has a long tradition in international tradetheory. See
the discussion of it in Mussa (1974) and Dornbusch (1974, 1980). Edwards
(1988) provides a diagrammatical discussion of this standard model.
7The distinction between two types of tradablegoods (X and M) and
a nontradable good (N) is analytically convenient, and is at the very core
of modern open economy macroeconomics. In practice, however, it is not easy
to determine which goods are actually tradables and which are nontradables.
Indeed, statistics for the vast majority of countries do not make such a
distinction. Although this practical difficulty does not invalidate the
usefulness of the dependent economy model, it does imply that analysts and
policymakers should be particularly careful (and creative) when using this
model. At the simplest level it can be argued that (at least) a large5
Households consume all three goods and maximize a utility function subject
to a constraint which states that the value of expenditure does not exceed
income. There are a large number of identical producers and perfect
competition prevails in the goods markets. Firms are assumed to maximize
profits subject to existing technology and to the available factors of pro.
duction: labor, capital and natural resources.8 In addition to consumers
and producers, there is a government that imposes a tariff on imports.
Following traditional trade theory it is assumed that the revenue from the
tariff is handed back to consumers in a lump-sum fashion.9 There are no
other taxes and no government spending on goods or services. Finally, we
use the price of exportables as the numeraire.
Denoting the revenue function by R, the expenditure function by E,
the price of nontradables relative to exportables by q, and that of
importables relative to exportables by p. the equilibrium in this simple
economy can be represented by the following set of equations (where a
10 subindex refers to a partial derivative):
R(1p,q;L,KG) +(E-R)—E(l,p,q,U), (1)
percentage of the services sector of an economy is constituted by nontrad-
ables. It is important to note, however, that the importance of this non-
tradable sector will vary across countries. For instance, some authors have
argued that, strictly speaking, in the case of Uruguay there are no nontrad-
ables: at least for Argentinian consumers all Uruguayan goods are tradable.
8Alternatively, we can assume that there are two factors only --
capitaland labor -- andthat capital is sector specific in the short-run.
In fact this formulation is much simpler than the one used in this section.
On three-factor models of international trade see Learner(1987).
9For a model where the government uses tariff proceeds to finance its
ownconsumption,see Edwards (l989a).
10For a detailed exposition of traditional trade theory using duality
see Dixit and Norman (1980).6
E —R , (2) q q
pp*+r,. (3)
where L, K, and C are labor, capital and natural resources, respective-
ly. r is the specific import tariff, (E-R) are imports, and U is
total utility. Equation (1) is the budget constraint and establishes that
total income -- stemmingfrom factors' income and government transfers --
hasto equal expenditure. Equation (2) is the nontradables equilibrium
condition, while equation (3) establishes the relation between the domestic
price of importables and the import tariff r.
As in most traditional trade models we assume that factors supplies --
andin particular the supply of labor --areinelastic.11 The initial labor
market equilibrium is illustrated in Figure 1, where the horizontal axis
measures total labor available in the economy and the vertical axis depicts
the wage rate in terms of exportables. Schedule L, denotes the demand for
labor by the tradable gooda sector and is equal to the horizontal sum of the
demand for labor by the exportables sector, (schedule Lx) and the demand
for labor by the importables sector. Demand for labor by the nontradable
goods sector is shown by schedule LN. The initial equilibrium is charac-
terized by full employment and a wage rate equal to w0. At this position
OTLA labor is used in the production of exportables, LALS labor is
employed in the production of importables, and ONLB labor is used in the
-productionof nontradables. In what follows we will assume that in the
short-run only labor cart aove across sectors, although in the long-run, all
three factors are assumed to be mobile. However, since our main interest is
11We relax this assumption in Section V where we analyzequeuing








on the short run consequences of structural reform, most of our discussion
will focus on the Ricardo-Viner case with factor specificity.
Consider now a tariff liberalization reform that reduces the import
tariff and, thus, causes a reduction in the domestic price of importables. In
this simple general equilibrium framework this reform will affect a number of
variables including relative prices. With regard to employment, the tariff
reduction will provoke changes in the allocation of labor across sectors.
In order to track down the full effect of the reform on the labor market
it is first necessary to determine the effect of the reduction in tariffs on
the price of nontradable goods. Only then we will be able to know the
direction of the shift of schedule LN in Figure 1. From the manipulation of
equations (l)-(3) it is easy to show that the direction in which the price of
nontradables will change is going to depend on the assumptions made regarding
substitutability in demand and on the magnitude of the income effect.
Assuming that the three goods are gross substitutes in consumption and that
the income effect does not exceed the substitution effect, it can be shown
that as a result of the tariff reform the price of nontradables will fl
relativeto that of exportables: that is dq/dr >
Thelabor market adjustment process under these assumptions is
illustrated in Figure 2. The reduction in the tariffs will result in a
lower domestic price of importables, generating a downward shift of the
curve (with the L curve constant). The new 14 curve will intersect the
L curve at R. However, since as pointed out above the reduction in the
world price of importables will also result in a decline in the price of
12For a formal and more complete analysis of the effects of tariff
reforms and terms of trade disturbances on the equilibrium real exchange








nontradables (relative to exports), this is not the final equilibrium. As a
consequence of the decline of q, L will shift downward (by less than the
shift in L.r) and the final short-run equilibrium will be achieved at S
with a lower wage rate w1. In this new equilibrium, production of export-
ables has increased --withlabor used by this sector increasing by LALQ.
The production of nontradables may either increase or decrease, and
production of importables will fall. In the case depicted in Figure 2,
labor has moved out of the importables sector and into the exportables and
nontradables sectors.
What has happened to factor rewards in the short run? Wages have
declined in terms of exportables (from w0 to w1 in Figure 2). Wages
have also declined in terms of nontradables because the vertical distance
between the and L, curves is smaller than the reduction in w from
w0 to w1. Wages, however, have increased relative to importables because
the domestic price of these goods has fallen by more than the decline in
wages. In the exportables sector, the real return to the sector specific
factors has increased. However, the real return to these fixed factors in
the importables and nontradables sectors could either increase or decrease.13
In summary, in the standard Ricardo-Viner model with wage flexibility,
the short-run effects on production, prices, and factor rewards of a tariff
liberalization reform will be as follows: (1) production of exporcables
will increase; (2) production of importables will decrease; (3) produc-
tion of nontradables may increase or decrease; (4) prices of nontradables
will decrease; (5) wages will increase in terms of importables and
13Formally, the real return on the sector specific factors allocated to
the importables sector will decrease in terms of importables and could either
increase or decrease in terms of the other two goods. See Edwards (1988).9
decrease in terms of exportables and nontradables; (6) the real return to
the sector specific factors allocated to the exportables sector will
increase relative to all goods; (7) the real return to factors specific to
the importables sector will decrease relative to importables but could
increase or decrease relative to the other goods; and (8) the real return
to factors specific to the nontradables sector will increase relative to
nontradable goods but could either increase or decrease relative to the
other two goods.
Until now we have assumed that the main difference between the short-
and long-run effects of a trade liberalization is that in the short-run
capital and natural resources are locked into its sector of origin. As time
passes, however, capital will (slowly) move between sectors. To simplify
the exposition, let us assume that the movement of capital does not require
the use of resources. However, the analysis could be modified by introduc-
ing a "moving industry", which uses labor and a specific factor, as in Mussa
(1978). The transition period will be characterized by factors moving
between sectors, until the new long-run equilibrium (that is, post trade
liberalization) capital-labor ratios and production levels are attained.
The analysis of the long run equilibrium when the three factors are
mobile can be rather complicated. The reason, of course, is that with three
factors the concept of factor intensities becomes somewhat ambiguous.
However, as Learner (1987) has shown, if we assume that a particular sector
is more intensive in a factor relative to both of the other factors, then
the Stolper-Samuelson theorem will still hold.14 In terms of our
discussion, if we assume that the importables sector is the least labor
formal and detailed discussion of the long run case is given in
Edwards (1990).10
intensive sector, relative to both capital and natural resources, then we
can conclude that in the long-run real wages will increase, as occurred in
the two-factors case analyzed in Edwards (1988).
Although the dependent economy framework presented here provides a
useful starting point for analyzing the way in which a trade reform affects
the labor market, it has a number of shortcomings. Among these, perhaps the
most important one is the assumption of factor price flexibility. In fact,
in many developing nations there exist some kind of (real) wage rigidity. A
second shortcoming of this model is that it ignores all intertemporal
considerations. In that regard, within this framework it is not possible to
analyze issues related to restrictions to capital movements, or to the way
in which the level of employment reacts to anticipated changes in tariffs.
A third limitation of this standard formulation is that it assumes, within
the tradition of trade theory, that the labor supply is completely inelas-
tic. Finally, the assumption of no-search activities on behalf of workers
is also quite stringent and unrealistic. In the following sections we
present several models that attempt to overcome (some of) these limitations.
11.1 Sector Soecific Human Caoital
So far we have referred to labor as a homogeneous factor. However, for
the type of question we are studying, allowing for differences in general
human capital would not change the results qualitatively. In fact, we could
easily incorporate differences in general human capital by introducing the
distinction between units of labor and number of workers. That is, some
workers would have embodied more units of labor than others. However, if we
assume the existence of sector-specific or industry-specific human capital
(Ci (1962)) our conclusions would be affected because in that case labor
mobility would be costly.11
Oneofthe consequences of a trade liberalization reform is that it
wipes Out entire industries, destroying the value of industry-specific human
capital. This loss of productive factors, in different degrees, has to be
considered as part of the adjustment costs of trade liberalization. In
practice, this cost translates into a type of unemployment that reflects
differences between the market value of a given worker's human capital and
the same worker's perception of what that value is, based on his or her
recent experience and expectations. This type of phenomenon will affect
more seriously the more experienced groups of the labor force.
Moreover, the change in relative prices brought about by a trade
liberalization not only changes the market value of sector-specific human
capital, but also affects the geographical allocation of labor demand.
Mobility costs associated to labor reallocation across areas can thus become
an additional barrier to full employment immediately after a trade reform
takes place. In fact, the labor economics literature has given attention to
this type of adjustment barrier in an effort to explain wage differentials
and unemployment across geographical areas or sectors of economic activity
(see, for example, Topel (1986)). These ideas, although not yet applied to
the question of trade reform, can be very useful in an empirical analysis of
trade liberalization experiences.
III. Wage Rialdities and Labor Market Adlustaent
The discussion in Section II has followed the traditional Australian
model of international trade, which assumes that all factor prices, includ-
ing wages, are perfectly flexible. However, as said before, this is a
simplifying assumption that does not correspond to reality in many develop-
ing countries where minimum wage laws or other types of rigidities affect12
the whole economy or some parts of it.15 In the past ten years or so, a
number of international trade models that assume some type of factor price
rigidity have been developed (see Brecher 1974; Bruce and Purvis 1984).
These models have been useful and have added considerable realism to the
analysis, but moat of them have concentrated on the case in which the econ-
omy produces only two goods, and have not addressed specifically the way in
which trade liberalization reforms will affect aggregate employment. This
section extends these results to the three-goods model used in the previous
section and discusses the effects of tariff liberalization under both
economy-wide and sector-specific wage rigidities stemming from exogenously
imposed minimum wages. Again, the analysis concentrates mainly on the
short-run case in which capital and natural resources are locked into their
sector of origin. Although the discussion emphasizes the case of minimum
wages, the analysis is also useful for understanding the effects on employ-
ment of other mechanisms widely applied in developing countries, such as
wage indexation arrangements, and disequilibrium real wages set by powerful
labor unions.
111.1 Economy-Wide Wase Rizidities
Consider first the case of an economy-wide minimum wage. In order to
facilitate the diagrammatical exposition, this minimum wage is assumed to be
expressed in terms of our numeraire (exportables))6 The incorporation of
an economy-wide minimum wage into the analysis requires that we modify the
model given by equations (1)-(3) above. Specifically, we now need to define
15For a review of practices used in different countries to determine
minimum wages, see Starr (1981).
16The results presented below are fairly sensitive to this assumption.
Edwards (1990) discusses in detail how using different price indexes to set
the minimum wage will affect the results from the model.13
a "restricted" revenue function that considers the existence of wage rigidi-
ties and initial unemployment such as:17
(W,p,q;V) —max((S+qS+pS)WL) (4)
S,L
where W is the minimum wage; L is employment; S1, i —X,M,N,refers
to output of exportables, importables, and nontradables, respectively; and
V refers to the vector of non-labor (flexible-price) factors of production.
This restricted revenue function can be conveniently written in the
following way:
R —R(1,p,q,L(1,p,q,W)) (5)
where L( ) is an emDlovment function (see Neary (1985)).
In this case the nontradable market equilibrium condition also has to
incorporate in an explicit way the existence of wage rigidity and of initial
unemployment. This is done by computing the supply of nontradables as the




The nature of the initial labor market equilibrium is now captured by
Figure 3 which is similar to Figure 1. Demand for labor by the tradable goods
sectors (LT) is equal to the horizontal sum of the demand for labor by the
exportables sector (Lx) and the demand for labor by the importables sector
(LH not shown). Demand for labor by the nontradables sector is given by the
schedule. If there is a minimum wage rate equal to ,unemploymentof
magnitude U' will result; the amount of labor demanded by the nontradables
17 . .
SeeNeary (1985) for a detailed discussion of the properties of














sector is now determined by the minimumwageand is equal to ONL.
Figure4 shows that when labor is the only mobile factor, and there is
a minimum wage in real terms (expressed in terms of the exportables) a
tariff reduction will result in an increase in the extent of unemployment
which is then given by U',. As shown in the previous section, the reason
for this is the decline in the (real) wage that a trade liberalization will
require in order to maintain the pre-reform level of employment. If, due to
institutional factors, this reduction cannot take place, the adjustment will
occur via quantities and total employment will be reduced. The extent of
the change in employment will in turn depend on: (1) the magnitude of the
tariff reduction;(2) the amount by which the price of nontradables goes
down; and (3) the employment elasticities in the different sectors.
Formally, the effect of a tariff change on total employment is given by
the expression:
—+ Lq() (7)
where L and Lq are the derivatives of the employment function with
respect to the domestic price of importables and the relative price of non-
tradables respectively, and where (dq/d) is the "real exchange rate
effect" of the tariff change. Within our Ricardo-Viner framework with
initial unemployment both L and Lq are positive, indicating that
increases in domestic prices will result in higher employment.19 On the
other hand, as discussed in Section II, under the most plausible set of
18Notice, however, that if the minimum wage is fixed in terms of the
importable good, the tariff reform will not generate any unemployment. This
is because in order for the wage rate to remain constant in terms of M, it
will have to decline in terms of the exportable (see Edwards (1990)).
L9As seen below, in the case of full factor mobility it is rather
difficult to sign these derivatives.15
assumptions (dq/dr) will be positive, indicating that a tariff increase
(liberalization) will result in a real exchange rate appreciation (deprecia-
tion). Consequently, equation (7) as a whole has a positive sign, implying
that with rigid (real) wages and factor specificity a trade liberalization
reform will result in unemployment.
What will happen in the long-run? In this case all factors will move
across sectors and the interpretation of terms L and Lq in equation (7)








where RLL is the slope of the marginal product of labor schedule and is
negative. RPL and RqL on the other hand, are Rybczynski terms that
capture what will happen to output of M and N (Rand Rq respective-
ly) if there is an increase in the labor force. Their sign is undetermined
a priori and depend on relative factor intensities, which are difficult to
determine in our 3x3 model. However, as Learner (1987) has shown, if
nontradables is the most labor intensive sector -- bothwith respect to
capital and with respect to natural resources -- RqLwill be positive.
This means that RpL can be either positive or negative. A necessary (al-
though not sufficient) condition for it to be positive is that importables
is the second most labor intensive sector. If we assume that R is also
pL
positive, then we will obtain the result in which a tariff liberalization
reduces employment. If, however, importables is the least labor intensive
sector (as measured with respect to both of the other factors) RL will be16
negative and we can obtain the more standard result where, starting from an
initial condition of unemployment, a trade liberalization reform will
increase total employment in the economy.
111.2 Sector Soecific Waae Rate Riaiditv
In most countries wage rigidity is not generalized, but rather affects
a subgroup of sectors in the economy. In this subsection we will briefly
use our diagrammatic apparatus to analyze two cases where the above-equilib-
rium wage affects only one sector in the economy.20
Case 1:Sector-Specific Ware Riziditv With No Unemoloyment
This configuration of the labor market has recently been used by Burda
and Sachs (1987) to analyze the structure of unemployment in Germany. It is
assumed that one sector, say nontradables, is subject to an above-equilib-
rium wage rate, and that the wage rate in the rest of the economy --theso-
called uncovered Sector -- takesthe level required to assure full employ-
ment in the economy as a whole. The initial conditions under these
assumptions are summarized in Figure 5, where is the minimum wage in
the protected sector (the nontradables sector) and WT is the wage rate in
the uncovered (tradables) sector. Employment in tradables is equal to the
distance OTA, while employment in nontradables is equal to ONA.
Under these conditions, and assuming that capital and natural resources
are sector-specific, a trade liberalization reform will result in an
increase in the wage gap between the protected and the uncovered sectors, in
a reduction in employment in nontradables and importables and in an increase
in employment and output in exportables (see Figure 6).
20The formal analysis of a sector-specific wage rate rigidity is








The main limitation of this approach is, indeed, that it is
characterized by a non-equilibrium wage rate differential (WNWT) that can
only be maintained if there are severe barriers to entry to the protected
sector. Only in this way it can be reconciled having a major distortion in
the labor market, in the form of intersectoral wage differentials, and no
unemployment. An elegant way of solving this problem is by introducing, as
we do below, a Harris-Todaro type of mechanism to generate an equilibrium
wage rate differential.
Case 2:Sector-Specific Minimum Waees With tinemolovment
Consider now the case where there is a binding minimum wage in the
inmortables sector only. In order to analyze this case, the diagrams used
previously must be somewhat modified. Figure 7 is similar to Figure 5,
except that in Figure 7, total labor used in the importables sector is
measured from the right-hand side origin °M• The wage rate WM is the
minimum wage in the importables sector (say, manufacturing); I is employ-
ment in this sector. Curve qq is a rectangular hyperbola known as the
Harris-Todaro locus, along which the following equation is satisfied:
W W LMw N X1+1J M' (9)
21 where U is the equilibrium level of employment. In the absence of a
minimum wage, equilibrium is attained at point Z. With a minimum wage,
however, the intersection of (L+L) with qq at point S gives the wage
rate in the uncovered (no minimum wage) sectors, employment in each Sector,
is based on Harris and Todaro (1970) and Harberger (1971). For
the use of this framework in the context of a two-sector economy, see
Corden and Findlay (1975) and Neary (1981). The discussion that follows














































































































and total unemployment. The distance ORLXistotal employment in the
exportables sector; the distance l+LN) is employment in nontradables;
the distance (L.4-L.N)LM is the initial equilibrium level of unemployment;
and the distance OMLL, is employment in the covered sector.22
The short-run (with capital immobile across sectors) effects of a
reduction in the world price of importables are illustrated in Figure 8. As
a result of the decline in the world price of importables, demand for labor
in that sector shifts downward. At the given minimum wage, WM, total
demand for labor in the importables sector will decline. The new demand for
labor in the importables sector (not drawn) will intersect at A. A
new rectangular hyperbola q'q' passes through this point and labor
demanded by the importables sector is now reduced to
What will happen to wages and employment in the uncovered sectors, and to
unemployment? Under the assumption that the price of nontradables remains
constant, curve (Lx+L.N) remains at its original location, and point B,
given by the intersection of q'q' and (1.fL),isthe new equilibrium.
This position is characterized by a lower wage and higher employment in the
uncovered sectors. As discussed above, however, the reduction of tariffs will
affect the price of nontradables and (Lx+L) will not remain constant.
Under the assumptions discussed before, the lower tariffs will generate a
reduction in the price of nontradables, which is, however, smaller than the
decline in the price of importables. As a result, in the final short-run
equilibrium, (Lx+LN) will shift downward to (L.x+LN)' (not drawn). The
intersection of (L+LN)' and the q'q' rectangular hyperbola at point C
22There is an important difference between this type of minimum wage
model in which total availability of labor to the economy is given and
models with an upward sloping aggregate supply of labor. On this last type
of model, see A. Cox-Edwards (1986), and Section V of this paper.19
is the final equilibrium when capital is locked in its sector of origin.
Under the given assumptions, the post-tariff reduction equilibrium is
characterized by the following: (1) lower employment in the sector covered
by the minimum wage (importables); (2) lower wages in the uncovered
sectors, expressed in terms of exportables; (3) either higher or lower
equilibrium unemployment;(4) either lower or higher employment in
nontrsdables; and (5) higher employment and production in exportables.23
Not surprisingly, a tariff liberalization in the case of partial minimum
wage coverage generates a different outcome than that obtained in the case of
an economy-wide minimum wage. First, under partial coverage, there is an
increase in production and employment in exportables. Second, employment in
nontradables may also increase. Also, in the short-run, the reduction in
tariffs can result in a decline in the equilibrium level of unemployment in
the case of partial minimum wage coverage, whereas greater unemployment always
results after such a policy in the case of an economy-wide minimum wage. This
illustrates an important finding: in the presence of labor market distor-
tions, trade liberalization policies usually considered to be beneficial may
generate nontrivial (short-run) unemployment problems.
What will happen in the long-run in the presence of this type of
sector-specific minimum wage? In the short-run, after the domestic price of
importables has gone down, the real return to (sector-specific) capital will
be different across sectors. The reduction in tariffs reduces the return to
capital in the importables (manufacturing) sector and increases it in the
exportables and nontradables sectors. Of course, this situation with
23 - Inthis setting, unemployment is given by U —LM(WM/WNl).Because
declines and W /Wgoes up, it is not possible totnow a orion which
way U will go.Tile hnal direction will depend on the elasticities of
demand for labor in each sector.20
different real returns to capital cannot continue in the long run. As time
goes by, capital will be reallocated, moving out of importables and into the
other sectors. In terms of Figure 8, this means that LM will shift
further downward -- andwith it the rectangular hyperbola qq -- while
demand for labor in the uncovered sectors will shift upward. Moreover,
these curves will shift in such a way that the final Outcome will be char-
acterized by a higher equilibrium wage in the absence of wage rigidities.
The final long-run equilibrium will have to satisfy two conditions:
the return to capital will be equalized across sectors and the labor market
will be in equilibrium, in the sense that — — As
capital is reallocated, employment in the importables sector declines and
employment in the exportables and nontradables sectors increases in relation
to the short-run levels depicted in Figure 8. It is not possible, however,
to know a Driori whether wages in the uncovered sectors (nontradables and
exportables) will be higher or lower in the long-run than their initial
levels. This will depend on the elasticities of substitution and on the
relation between the slopes of the LM qq, and (Lx+LN) curves.
IV. The Liberalization of the CaDital Account. Anticiopted Tariffs and
EmDlovIIent
The precedingframework has ignored intertemporal decisions and, thus,
is unable to handle some important questions related to issues such as the
employment effects of relaxing capital controls, or the employment consequ-
ences of an anticipated change in tariffs. The purpose of this section is
to extend the dependent economy model to an intertemporal setting and to




















24 from the static model analyzed before.
V.1 The Intertemooral Deendent Economy Model
The simplest way to incorporate intertemporal aspects is by considering
the existence of two periods -.thepresent (period 1) and the future (period
2). If we now want to look at capital account liberalization we must assume
that initially there are capital controls that are reflected in a different-
ial between the domestic real interest rate (r) and the foreign real
interest rate (r*). As before, it is assumed that there are a large number
of producers and (identical) consumers, and that perfect competition
prevails. The labor market is distorted by a minimum wage i,whichwe
first assume is in effect in both periods.
In this 2-period model consumers maximize utility subject to their
intertemporal budget constraint, whereas firms maximize profits subject to
the existing constant returns to scale technology, availability of factors
of production, and the predetermined minimum wage. Assuming that the
utility function is time separable, with each subutility function homothetic






where now the lower case letters refer to first period variables and the upper
case letters refer to second period variables. The price of exportables has
24The discussion that follows focuses on the role of intertemooral
substitution in consumption. Some macroeconomic models that became popular
in the l970s also emphasized intertemporal substitution in the supply of
labor. However, recent empirical work by Altonji (1982) and Mankiw et al.
(1985) have shown that the type of effect is not empirically relevant.22
been taken to be the numeraire, (e.g., p — — 1).V ia the intertemporal
welfare function; u and U are periods 1 and 2 subutility functions
assumed, as pointed out, to be homothetic and identical. cM cN (CXCM
and CN) are consumption of X,M and N in period one (two). q and Q,
and p and P are the prices of nontradables and importables relative to
exportables faced by consumers in periods 1 and 2, and are inclusive of the
tariff on H. £ is the domestic discount factor equal to (1+r). Since
there is a tax on foreign borrowing, the domestic real interest rate r is
higher than the world interest rate. The differences between these two rates
is given by the tax (a) on capital movements: r —r*+a.
Wealth is the discounted sum of consumer's income in both periods.
Income, in turn, is given by: (1) income from labor services; (2) income
from the renting of capital stock, and of natural resources that consumers
owntodomestic firma; and (3) income obtained from government transfers.
These, in turn, correspond to the government's revenue from tariffs, and
from taxes on capital flows in each period. The solution to the consumers
optimizing problem is conveniently summarized by the following intertemporal
expenditure function:
E —E(ir(l,p,q),£*fl(l,p,Q),V). (11)
where w and IIare exact price indexes for periods 1 and 2. Under the
assumptions of homotheticicy and separability these price indexes correspond
to unit expenditure functions (Svensson and Razin, 1983; Edwarda and van
Wijnbergen, 1986). Given our assumption of a time separable utility
function, total expenditure in periods 1 and 2 are always substitutes.
As before the producers maximization problem can be summarized with the
aid of restricted revenue functions, which give us the maximum revenue that23
firms can obtain after making all the optimal decisions in terms of hiring and
production given the distortion in the labor market (see Neary 1985). Denoting




where 1( )andL( )areemployment functions in periods 1 and 2
The complete model is then given by the following set of equations (where
subindexes refer to partial derivatives with respect to that variable):
r(l,p,q,1(l,p,q,)) + 6R(1,P,Q,L(1,P,Q,))
+ TRANS —E(r(1,p,q),5fl(1,P,Q),V) (14)
TRANS—bCA+ 1M1 + 6r2M2 (15)
b—*.6 (16)
CA —R-flE (17)
r —E (18) q q
RQ —EQ (19)
p..p*+f1; p_p*+r2 (20)
—(E-r); H2 —(ER) (21)
Equation (14) is the intertemporal budget constraint and says that the
present value of income (the left hand side) has to equal the present value
of expenditure (the right hand side). TRANSisthe present value of govern-
ment transfers to the public and is given by equation (15). Here bCA is
the present value of the tax on foreign borrowing, where b is the present24
value of the tax per unit borrowed and is equal to (6*.5), and CA is the
current account in period 2, which is defined in equation (17) as period 2
income minus expenditure. This means that, since in this model there is no
investment, the current account is equal to savings in each period. Final-
ly, and 62M2 in equation (15) are revenues from import tariffs;
is the tariff rate in period i, and are imports in i and are
defined in equation (21) as the excess demand for importables in each
period. Equations (18) and (19) state that the nontradables goods market
has to clear in each period --rq
and are quantities produced of
these goods, while Eand EQ are the quantities demanded.
An important characteristic of this model is that there is initial
unemployment. In fact, we can think of Figure 3 in Section III as capturing
the initial conditions prevailing in the labor market in each period.
Notice that, as presented above, the model assumes that the minimum wage
(w) is expressed in terms of the numeraire and is in effect in both
periods. Of course, this need not be the case, and we can easily handle the
case where there is a minimum wage in one period only.
In the rest of this section we will illustrate the functioning of this
model for the case of two liberalization policies: (1) the relaxation of
capital controls and, (2) an anticipated tariff liberalization. In order
to facilitate the discussion, in each case we will make some simplifying
assumptions that will allow us to focus on the problem at hand.
IV.2 Caoital Account Liberalization and Employment
The model presented in equations (14) through (21) is very general and
can be used to analyze how a number of structural adjustment policies will
affect welfare, output and employment. In order to organize the discussion
in this subsection we will focus on the employment effects of reducing25
capital controls under a set of simplifying assumptions.25 In particularwe
will assume that:
(1) the minimum wage is in effect during period 1 only;26
(2) there are no import tariffs in either period.
Thus, under these simplifying assumptions the only distortions in theeconomy
under analysis are a minimum wage in period 1 and a tax on foreignborrowing.
A reduction in the extent of capital controls implies that the domestic
discount factor & increases, moving closer to its international level 6*.
As a result of this the consumption rate of interest Sfl/,r will increase
making current consumption relatively more attractive than future consump-
tion. Thus, households will substitute expenditure into thepresent. Since
some of this increase in expenditure in period 1 will fall on nontradables
there will be an incipient excess demand for N which will result inan
increase in the price of N in that period (q). This means, then, that
period 1 real exchange rate will experience an equilibrium appreciation as
a result of the liberalization of the capital account (Edwards, 198gb).
This, in turn, will shift the demand for labor in the N sector upward,
generating an increase in emolpvment in oeriod 1. This effect will be
reinforced by the positive welfare effect of reducing the existing
distortion on foreign borrowing.
In a Ricardo-Viner framework with sector specific capital and natural
resources this is the final effect of a capital account reform. However, if
we assume that capital and natural resources can move across sectors we will
25The liberalization of capital controls hasplayed an important role inrecent reform programs, as those of the Southern Cone of Latin America
and Korea.
26
This assumption is also made by Svensson (1984) in a different
context.26
have additional indirect effects that will shift further the labor demand
schedules. The direction and magnitude of these induced shifts will depend
on the sign of the Rybczynski effects. If we assume that the nontradable
sector (N) is the most labor intensive of all sectors and that the
importable sector (M) is the least labor intensive, the final effect of a
capital account reform will be an increase in period 1 employment (see
Edwards 1989b, for a formal expression). This labor market adjustment is
captured in Figure 9 where the shift of LN to L is the result of the
(impact) real exchange rate effect of a higher 6, and the shift of to
and of L.r to are the consequences of the reallocation of the
cooperative factors.
A very interesting consequence of this analysis is that under our
assumptions the optimal government policy would be to impose a rnflsubsidy
on foreign borrowing. The reason for this result is that, under these
coti4itions, a small subsidy on external borrowing results in higher consump-
tion, and thus employment, in period 1. Since initially employment in this
period was "too low", the small subsidy will tend to correct this
distortion. The magnitude of this subsidy will be given by:
r £ (—i)+ 5*RL (—s)
b*— lqdb LQdb (22)
H2Ej+flE11Tq() +£flEflQ()
where r2 and are the marginal product of labor in periods 1 and 2.
and LQ are the derivatives of each period employment function with










andr11 are, in turn, the slopes of the marginal productof labor
schedules for N and are negative; rqj and RQL are the Rybczynski terms
that capture what will happen to output of N (rq and RQ) when there is
an increase in labor supply. Under our assumptions of labor intensities
they are positive. Finally (dq/db) and (dQ/db) are the "real exchange"
rate effects of the capital account liberalization and measure the resction
of the equilibrium relative prices of N to a lowering of the tax on
foreign borrowing and are positive (Edwsrds l989b).
IV.3 Anticinated Tariff Reform and Emolovment
The model developed in this section can be used for analyzing how the
expectations or anticipations of a tariff reform -- thatis a reduction in
--willaffect employment in an economy with initial unemployment. As in the
case of capital accOunt liberalization the main channel through which these
anticipations will generate an effect will be the intertemporal substitution
of expenditure and its effects on the real exchange rate. To the extent that
an anticipated tariff reform results in a postponement of current expenditure
we will observe, in the Ricardo-Viner case, a reduction in the price of
nontradables in the current period, q,and a decline in employment.
Formally, under Ricardo-Viner assumptions of sector-specific capital
and natural resources, the aggregate employment effects of an anticipated
tariff reform are given by:
period 1: —.2(3_) (23)
dr2 q dr2
dL dQ
period 2: —+ LQ(5) (24)
dr dr
These expressions capture several important results. First, as can be
seen from equation (23), a future (anticipated) tariff reform will affect31
A crucial difference between the current model and that discussed in
Section II is that in this case we will have an equilibrium level of
queuing
unemployment. In equilibrium, the eected wage in the protectedsegment,
for those who choose to queue, will be equal to the alternativewage in the
free segment. Figure 11 shows the presence of both types ofunemployment.
The presence of wage "protection" results in a very elastic labor
supply to the "protected" sector (M) and a less elastic labor supply to
the rest of the labor market. As a result, the general trend will be for
quasi-voluntary unemployment to fall when labor demand increases in the M
sector and for the free sector wage to increase when labor demand increases
in the N and X sectors.
In what follows we develop a formal model for analyzing theway in
which tariff liberalization will affect unemployment andwages in our
framework with upward sloping supply and queuing. We defineL, Lx and
as the general equilibrium demand functions for labor in the
nontradables, exportables and importables sectors. The aggregate supply of
labor to the economy Ls is a function of (real) wages, and can in fact be
expressed as depending on the wage rate in manufacturing. We call fithe





The fraction (1-fl) of individuals with supply price lower or equal to
WM have three alternatives: (a)to become part of the total supply of
labor to the nonprotected sectors. We assume, however, that in spite of
having jobs in the unprotected sector, this group can still apply to jobs in
sector M and has a probability p of being chosen; (b) spend the
present period queuing, so that the probability of getting a job in sector32
M increases to -yp (p>l);(c) become voluntarily unemployed with respect
to sectors N and X and involuntarily unemployed with respect to H.
Assuming risk neutrality and no unemployment compensation, the present
value of the first two slternatives for the marginal worker has to be the
same. There will thus be an equilibrium queuing unemploymentlevel for each
possible value of WM. To simplify the notation, we present here the case
in which all jobs turn over each period. Thus che vslue of (a) is
(lp)WN +PWM;




with p— v e
(28)
+7U +L1,
where is the number of workers employed in the nontrsdsbles sector, Lx
is the number of workers employed in the exportables sector,qv is the
level of quasi-voluntary unemployment, e is the level of equilibrium queu-
ing unemployment, and L, is the number of workers employed in the import-
sbles sector. Using the expression ue —Ud/LS(WM)
for the rate of equilib-




as well as the effective supply of labor to the nonprotected sectors of the
labor market that is equal to:
L(Wf) -(lfl)Ls(Wf)
-{-- {i4J]Lw (30)28
employment in the first period, when the reform has not taken place yet.
This effect takes place exclusively through the change in period 1 real
exchange rate which is induced by the future tariff reform. Edwards (l989b)
has shown that under plausible assumptions a future tariff liberalization
will result in a real exchange depreciation: that is, dq/dir2 > o.2 Under
Ricardo-Viner assumptions 1q is positive and, thus, dl/dr2 in equation
(23) is also positive.28 This means, then, that a future tariff reform will
result in a decline in today's aggregate employment.
Second, according to equation (24), there will be two channels through
which an anticipated tariff reform will affect period 2 aggregate employ-
ment. The first one, captured by the term is the direct effect which,
under Ricardo-Vjner assumptions, will be positive. The second channel is
given by the term LQ(dQ/d?2) and operates via changes in the equilibrium
real exchange rate in period 2. Under the most plausible assumptions a
tariff reform will result in a real exchange rate depreciation in the period
when the reform actually takes place; that is (dQ/dr2) > 0. Given that
under Ricardo-Viner assumptions LQ is also positive, expression (24) will
be unambiguously positive. This indicates that, if capital and natural
resources are sector-specific, an anticipated tariff reform will result in
an increase in unemployment in periods 1 and 2.
If instead of a Ricardo-Viner setting we assume that capital and natural
resources can move freely across sectors, the interpretation of equations (23)
27The conditions required for this resultare that all goods are
substitutes in consumption and that the income effects do not offset the
substitution effect.
28Remember that 2is the derivative of the employment function with
respect to the price In a Ricardo-Viner setting the only
effect of a change in q is a parallel shift in the L. schedule.29
and (24) will be different. As said before, the signs of 2q snd LQ will
then depend on the Rybczinski terms and, thus, on relative factor intensities.
V. Trade Restrictioms. Labor Market Protection and Elastic Labor SUDDIY
One of the shortcomings of the dependent economy model discussed in the
previous sections is that it assumes an inelastic labor supply. The purpose
of this section is to relax this assumption and to introduce a different type
of involuntary unemployment. Another simplification of the model previously
discussed is the lack of connection between the level of the minimum wage and
the trade orientation of the economy. In this section we assume that there is
some form of institutional wage protection (unions, government, or other) that
becomes stronger in an economy that is more closed to the rest of theworld.29
Thus, the minimum wage that prevails for the importables sector tends to be
relatively higher when there are high trade restrictions. In order to main-
tain our presentation at a simple level, we greatly simplify other aspects of
the problem, concentrating on a one period partial equilibrium representation.
This, however, proves sufficient for our purposes.
Consider, once again, a three-goods economy with exportables (X),
importables (M) and nontradables (N). Contrary to Section II we now assume
that there is a minimum wage that affects only one sector. More specifically,
we assume that the importablea sector (N)is subject to a minimum wage and
that wages are market determined in the nontradablea (N) and exportables (X)
sectors. In order to simplify the exposition we consider only two factors:
capital and labor. While capital is fixed in its sector of origin in the
short-run, it is perfectly mobile in the long-run.
29Monopaony power will tend to increase in the same way as monopoly
power under trade protection.30
We relax the assumption that labor supply is inelastic by considering
the existence of a distribution of labor supply prices, and by assuming that
labor force participation is determined by the market wage. Since wages in
the M sector are higher than in the rest of the economy, labor supply to
that sector exceeds demand. We assume for simplicity that firms in the M
sector select the workers they employ randomly (i.e. ,ina way that is
uncorrelated with labor supply prices) from the pool of applicants. As a
result, there will be some potential workers that would be willing to take a
"protected" job but are unwilling to settle for a lower wage in the N or X
sectors. This situation is described in Figure 10, where schedule L rep-
resents a labor supply derived from a linear distribution of supply wages.
At the minimum wage (WM), employment in M is equal to < LS(WM). By
assumption, employment in M is a random sample of LS(WM), which in turn
implies that the labor supply to the rest of the labor market (Li) is a
fraction (lL/Ls(WM)) of the original supply Ls. The interaction
between labor demand in X and N, denoted by (L+1) in Figure 10, and
the "residual" labor supply to those sectors will determine the free segment
wage Wf —WN_WXand the level of employment in X(Lx) and
Individuals with supply price above Wf and below WM are voluntarily
unemployed with respect to X and N and involuntarily unemployed with
___________________________ qv respect to N. We refer to this group as quasi-voluntary unemoloyed (U ).
Witha linear distribution of supply prices, the amount of quasi•voluntary
unemployment is given by:
W •W
qv — (l-$)L(W ) (25)
WMW a H
where is the smallest reservation wage for which the supply of labor to






V.1 keductjon in ImDort Tariffs
A reduction in import tariffs implies a decreasein the domestic price
of M falls relative to X. Additionally,
as discussed in Section II, the
reduction of the import tariffs will have an effecton the relative price of
nontradables: if nontradables are substituted withileportables and export-
ables in consumption, the reduction of the tariffwill result in a decline
in the price of nontradables30
Assuming, at least for the short-run, that the protected
wage
remains constant, we expect no change in labor forceparticipation. A
reduction in L -- generatedby the reduction in the tariff -.witha
given Ls(WM) means that the fraction fidefinedin (26), falls. In turn,
a reduced fraction of workers employed in H increases
the quasi-voluntary
unemployment and signals a lover probability of findinga protected job,
triggering a reduction in queuing unemployment31 Thus, laborsupply to the
free segment will shift downward inducing a reductionin the free sector
wage rate Wf. If we now consider the reduction in
Lf induced by the
decline in relative prices of noncradab].es (the real
exchange rate effect),
we get an even larger reduction in the nonprotectedwage rate tJf
In order to simplify the presentation in thederivations that follow we
will ignore the change in Lf and estimate theimpact on e of a change
in fiinducedby a reduction in the extent of trade protection.
Since, as
pointed out above, a tariff liberalization will result ina reduction in fl
ouranalysis will deal with the way in which changes in thisparameter will
30Notice that if trade liberalization
is accompanied by a large amount
of foreign aid or foreign credit capable ofinducing a large income effect,
the impact of the relative price of nontradables
may be positive.
31See Cox-Edwards (1986).34
affect unemployment and wages in the unprotected sector. Imposingthe
equilibrium condition in the free market sectors (X and N), we canfind
how the changes in the demand for labor in the protected sectorwill affect
unemployment and the freely determined wage rate:
e W W dW







whereLf — + 1_'N'Cf is the elasticity of labor supply to the free
sectors of the labor market, and is the elasticity of labor demand to
the free sectors.
The wage reduction in the non-protected or free sectors (X and N)
induces an increase in labor use in those sectors, but at the same time more
potential workers become quasi-voluntary unemployed. Therefore,the
immediate effect of trade liberalization is a loss of employment in theN
sector; the sector we associate with more "attractive" or"better paid"
jobs. This will increase the level of quasi voluntary snd queuing unemploy-
ment and will exert downward pressure on the level of wages asworkers seek
employment in the free segment.
The above discussion assumes that the protected wage segments are
maintained after the trade liberalization. This is not a fully plausible
assumption. In the long run we could indeed expect that tradeliberaliza-
tion would weaken the capability of governments to grant protection to
certain sectors of the labor market, and that wages would come down in line35
with labor market conditions.32
What will happen if WM is reduced? First, will increase not only
through the numerator (depending on 17M) but also through the denominator
because aggregate labor force participation will fall withWM. The
magnitude of this fall will depend on C, the elasticity of labor Supply to
the market. At the same time, the equilibrium level of queuing unemployment
will be affected by changes in $andWM. This, in turn, will affect
labor supply to the non-protected sector and Wf.
From (29) we have:
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Combining these expressions we obtain:
—L + LL+_ffl(MC) L-





32Noticethat here we are assuming that the minimum wage affects the
importable sector and, thus, that its level will be affected by changes in
the tariff. However, as John Knight pointed out to us at the conference,
this does not need to be the case for every country. Indeed, it is possible
that in some countries the exportables sector has a protected labor market.
This, of course, would change our result.36
For the particular case where —0and —- wehave that a
change in WM will affect e in the following way:
—_ [{.+ 4[))]
(35)
Notice that this expression states that a reduction in WM will generate
two offsetting effects on queuing unemployment. On the one hand, with the
reduction in WM the gains from queuing decrease, but at the same time the
probability of getting a job in the N sector rises. The higher is C,




We can then state:
e >0 if C—O
1 (36)
M'-<Oif C>l
and for 0 <C<1the effect of W on queuing unemployment will depend
on how close WM and Wf are at the initial level of WM. That is, the
expression due/dWM will be positive for a very inelastic labor supply and
will be negative for an elastic labor supply.
In short, the more time we allow for the adjustment of the labor market
(the more elastic is labor supply) ,thelarger will be the reduction in
induced by a downward adjustment of the protected sector wage rate WM. At
the same time, the level of quasi-voluntary unemployment will fall as the
difference between WM and Wf shortens:
— (I-) -
M




Summarizing, a reduction of tariffs that induce a reductionof
employment in the protected sector (importables) will result
in higher
quasi-voluntary unemployment, lower free aector wages andhigher free sector
employment in the short run. In the long run, weassume that the strength
of the wage protection weakens andWM falls. With the reduction of WM
labor force participation falls, the labor market
tightens, quasi-voluntary
unemployment falls and queuing unemployment ultimately fallsas the differ-
ence between free sector wages and protected
wages disappears. To complete
the previous analysis the effect of trade liberalizationon labor demand in
the free segment would have to be included. In this
caae, however, the
final result will depend on the factor intensities,on the income elasticity
of demand for nontradables, and on the size of theincome effect generated
by the reduction in employment in the importablessector.
In general it is not possible to determine
analytically if the average
level of wages falls or riaea with the trade liberalizationeffort. This
will depend on how distorted the labor marketwas initially and how we
weight the wage contribution of different groups.
VI. pjicludina Remarks
The purpose of this paper has been to providean analytical survey of a
number of international trade models that can deal withthe employment
consequences of trade reforms. Within the most basic trade framework--the
Heckscher-Ohlin model -- atrade liberalization does not generateany em-
ployment problems in a developing nation whereexports are labor intenaive.
In fact this will be the caae independently of whether
wages are flexible or
rigid. We started our discussion with an evaluation of the atandard
dependent economy model. However, contrary to traditionaltreatments we38
considered the case where there are three factors of production. This
extension introduced some non-trivial problems since in that case it is not
possible to determine unequivocally factor intensities. In this settingand
assuming wage flexibility, we showed that the short-run effects on produc-
tion, prices, and factor rewards of a tariff liberalizationreform will be
as follows:(1) production of exportables will increase;(2) production
of importables will decrease; (3) production of nontradables may increase
or decrease; (4) prices of nontradables will decrease;(5) wages will
increase in terms of importables and decrease in terms of exportables and
nontradables; (6)the real return to the sector-specific factors allocated
to the exportables sector will increase relative to all goods; (7)the
real return to factors specific to the importables sector will decrease
relative to importables but could increase or decrease relative to other
goods; and (8)the real return to factor-specific nontradables sector will
increase relative to nontradable goods but could either increase or decrease
relative to the other two goods. In the long run factor rewards are
equalized across sectors and under the assumption that the importables
sector is the least labor intensive sector, real wages will increase.
The same model indicates that trade liberalization results in
unemployment if wages do not adjust downward. If the wage rigidity is
limited to the importables sector only, there will be equilibrium unemploy-
ment initially and a trade liberalization will tend to increase the gap
between wages in the importables and the other sectors, the labor force in
this case will tend to be reallocated between nontradables and exportables.
The effect of trade liberalization on total unemployment is not clear
because there are two forces that affect the equilibrium level of unemploy-
ment in opposite directions. On the one hand the probability of finding a39
"high wage" job is reduced by the reduction in labor demand in M, but, on
the other hand, the wage in the rest of the labor market falls, reducing the
opportunity cost of unemployment.
The effect of capital account liberalization on the labor market was
studied using an intertemporal framework. Under the assumption that the
economy is distorted by controls to capital mobility and a minimum wage, we
find that the removal of capital controls tends to increase employment in
nontradables through a positive expenditure effect. In a similar framework
we also showed that an anticipated tariff reform can generate a negative
effect on the level of employment.
In the last section we paid closer attention to the starting conditions
of a typical protected economy. We modified the assumption of a given
minimumwageand assumed that the degree of wage distortion in the import-
ables sector was directly related to the degree of trade protection. In
this case, one of the implications of trade reform is the consequent
reduction of the predetermined wage in the importables sector to a level
compatible with market conditions. At the same time, we relax the assump-
tion of a fixed labor supply and thus allow labor force participation to be
a function of wages. We define labor force participation as determined by
all those workers willing to take a job in the high wage sector. In this
context we define quasi-voluntary unemployment as that which is involuntary
with respect to the importables sector, and voluntary with respect to the
rest of the labor market. Under these assumptions, the immediate effect of
a trade liberalization is a decline in the level of employment in the
importables sector, which will increase the level of quasi-voluntary unem-
ployment and will tend to reduce wages in the rest of the economy as some
workers seek employment there. In the long run we expect that trade40
liberalization would weaken the capability of governments to grant
protection to unions or certain sectors of the labor market, and that wages
would come down in line with labor market conditions. The structure of the
labor market will then change and the difference between protected wages and
free sector wages will tend to disappear, eliminating the distinction
between the two types of unemployment described in the text.
In this framework it is clear that wages in the importables sector
fall, although it is not clear how aggregate average wages behave. However,
it is perhaps in this setting that the opposition to trade liberalization
can be better understood. Labor, which is the factor of production that is
supposed to gain from freer trade is negatively affected in the short run
and the long term gains are hard to perceive when compared to the initially
distorted situation of the economy.41
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